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1.1. Definition of Failure mode and effects analysis 
FMEA is an analytical methodology used to ensure that potential problems have been 
considered and addressed throughout the product and process development cycle. FMEA helps 
to: 
 Discover the potential failures, their potential cause mechanisms and the risks designed 
into a product or process 
 Develop actions that reduce the risk of failure 
 Follow-up and evaluate the results of actions on the risks that were discovered 
1.2. Origin 
The FMEA discipline was developed in the United States Army. The Military Procedure MIL-
P-1629, titled Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis, is 
dated November 9, 1949. It was used as a reliability evaluation technique to determine the effect 
of system and equipment failures. Failures were classified according to their impact on mission 
success and personnel/equipment safety. It was later adopted in the Apollo space program of 
NASA to mitigate risk due to small sample sizes. The use of FMEA gained momentum during 
the 1960s, with the push to put a man on the moon and return him safely to earth. In the late 
1970s the Ford Motor Company introduced FMEA to the automotive industry for safety and 
regulatory consideration after the Pinto affair
 [1]
. They also used it to improve production and 
design.  
In 1971 NASA prepared a report for the U.S. Geological Survey recommending the use of 
FMEA in assessment of offshore petroleum exploration. Furthermore, in 1973 an U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency report described the application of FMEA to wastewater 
treatment plants. 
 
In the 1980s, the automotive industry began implementing FMEA by standardizing the structure 
and methods through the Automotive Industry Action Group. Although developed by the 
military, the FMEA method is now extensively used in a variety of industries including 
semiconductor processing, foodservice, plastics, software, aeronautics, automotive, and 
healthcare, etc. 
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1.3.  Design and structure 
The FMEA is based on these three sections: 
 Failures: identify how things can go wrong  
 Effects of Failures: understand various impacts of failure. Failures with severe impact 
need to be resolved on priority.  
 Causes of Failure: take action on these problems. Actions are most effective when they 
prevent causes of failure from occurring.  
FMEA will become effective only if the correct relationship between Failure Modes, Effects, 
Causes, actions and other elements is understood. The FMEA structure needs to be understood 
in its correct perspective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, Actions are thus elements of FMEA. Let us now examine each 
element in the FMEA structure. There are two ways of looking at an element of FMEA.  
The Designer’s view: This describes how the designer would look at the FMEA element. For 
DFMEA the designer is the Product Designer, and for PFMEA the designer is the Process 
Designer. The Designer is the one responsible for a failure-free working of the system.  
Figure 1.  
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Customer’s View: This describes how the customer would look at the FMEA element. The term 
Customer refers to the user of the system. These can be end-users (ones who buy the products) 
or internal customers within the organization.  
A very good way of correctly identifying and describing the element is to understand whether it 
is looked upon from the Customer’s view or the Designer’s view.  
Examples of Customers and Designers:  
1. For a DFMEA for a vehicle braking system the customer is the person who drives the 
car. The designer is the brake system designer.  
2. For a PFMEA for an Ambulance operation in a hospital, the customer is the patient as 
well as the hospital staff availing of the ambulance service. The designer is the 
ambulance service provider.  
3. For a PFMEA for a restaurant service, the customer is the one who visits the restaurant 
and would like to be served good quality food in a prompt manner. The designer is the 
restaurant manager who designs the logistics and work-flow of the ordering system and 
is responsible for the quick and accurate service of good food.  
Having understood designers and customers, let us look at the elements of FMEA.  
1. Item or Process Step: A DFMEA refers to an Item and a PFMEA to a Process Step as 
a starting point of the analysis. You perform the analysis on an Item or a Process Step.  
Examples of items are a Radiator in a truck, seat in an office or a probe in a patient 
heart-rate monitor. Items can refer to components, aggregates or entire products. 
Examples of Process Steps are receiving a phone call for Pizza delivery, Logging a 
customer complaint or Brazing Radiator tubes. An item should be described as 
visualized by the customer as well by the Designer.  
2. Function: Function is the task the system should perform in order to satisfy the quality 
or performance expectations of the Customer.  
Examples of Functions are pumping water to the overhead tank for a water pump 
DFMEA, and delivery of metered fluids and drugs through an intravenous delivery in a 
patient safety PFMEA. The function should be described as viewed by the Customer. A 
function description is the answer to the question, ‘What should the product or process 
do to satisfy the customer?’  
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Many times the analysts stop at the primary function description. Functions may go way 
beyond only the primary one. For example, a pump may have a primary function of 
delivering water to an overhead tank. However a noise-free and vibration-free operation 
is also an important function. The Automotive FMEA manual gives a listing of the 
following categories of functions that need to be considered:  
 Primary Design intent  
 Safety  
 Government regulations  
 Reliability (Life of the Function)  
 Loading and Duty Cycles: Customer Product usage profiles  
 Quiet Operations: Noise, Vibration and Harshness (NVH)  
 Fluid Retention  
 Ergonomics  
 Appearance  
 Packaging & Shipping  
 Service  
 Design for Assembly  
 Design for Manufacturability  
 
If functions from all the above categories are considered, the FMEA becomes a lot more 
comprehensive.  
3. Requirement: A requirement is a technical specification or a numerical measure of the 
desired function. Being a technical measure, this needs to be described from the 
Designer’s point of view.  
Examples of requirements are:  
o Flatness of 0.2 mm on a sealing surface for a Gate Valve DFMEA. 
o Pizza Delivery within 30 minutes for a Pizza Chain Service PFMEA.  
o Braking Distance of 6 meters when traveling at 40 Km/hr for a vehicle braking 
system DFMEA.  
Identifying requirements help you in quantifying the expectations from a function. This 
leads to a more precise way of addressing failure.  
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4. Failure Mode: A Failure Mode is the negation of the requirement. It is a description of 
the way in which a requirement is not met with. A Failure Mode needs to be described 
from the Customer’s as well as the Designer’s point of view. It can be identified by 
both. Examples of failure Modes:  
 An Ambulance reaching late for a Healthcare PFMEA. 
 A seal not being able to sustain the peak fluid pressure required by the design in 
a valve DFMEA.  
 A hotel check-out time exceeding the stipulated 3 minutes in a Service PFMEA.  
5. Effects and their respective Severities: Once a failure mode is identified, the team 
takes it up for detailed analysis. A failure will lead to many effects. Some effects are 
more severe in consequences, other less.  
Each one of the effects identified with the failure mode must be noted along with its 
severity ranking. The severity ranking is a number on the 1- 9 scale that tells you about 
how serious that effect of failure is. Rank 1 is for the least severe failure and rank 9 is 
for the most severe one.  
Effects should always be written as perceived by the customer. One failure mode will 
lead to many effects. Thus potentially every effect identified can occur once the Failure 
occurs. This means that the most serious effect can also occur once the Failure occurs. 
The failure mode of vehicle braking distance excess can have the following two 
consequences: 
 Accident leading to fatality: Very serious  
 Driver discomfort: Less serious  
It must be understood that once the braking distance exceeds the stipulated value both, 
accident as well as driver discomfort will occur.  
6. Causes, Occurrence & Detection rankings and Current Controls: Causes are 
mechanisms or events that lead to failure. These are identified by the analyst. The Cause 
descriptions should be written therefore as perceived by the designer. Along with the 
Cause narration, the following need to be identified:  
 Current controls of prevention of the cause from occurring.  
 Occurrence Ranking (scale 1- 9) that tells you how frequently a failure due to 
this cause can occur, in spite of the Current Control of Prevention being in 
place. Rank 9 is the most frequently. 
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 Current controls of detection that will detect that the cause or the Failure Mode 
has occurred.  
 Detection ranking (scale 1- 9) that tells you how easy or difficult are to identify 
the cause or failure once it occurs, in spite of the Current Detection Control 
being in place. Rank 9 is the failure most difficult to detect. 
7. Risk Priority Number (RPN): The Risk Priority Number for every Cause is the 
multiplication:  
 Occurrence Ranking X Detection Ranking X Highest Severity Ranking 
associated with the Failure Mode  
The RPN is one of the metrics that helps you prioritize causes with high risks on which 
actions need to be taken.  
8. Actions: Actions need to be taken on causes. Several actions can be taken to address the 
potential risk associated with the cause. The actions, responsibility and schedule thus 
need to be logged for each cause. Results of actions completed also need to be logged 
with each cause.  
Actions that have worked towards improvement provide an analyst with a model 
problem solving cycle in future risk analysis. Actions that have not yielded benefits also 
need to be logged to remind the future analysts of what has not worked in the past.  
To conclude, can be seen from the discussion above, that a FMEA has a tree structure: 
 An Item or Process Step can have several functions.  
 A single function can have several requirements.  
 A requirement can be negated by several failure modes.  
 
Once a Failure Mode is identified, it can be seen that: 
 Each Failure Mode can lead to several Effects. Each one of the effects can potentially 
happen once the Failure occurs.  
 Each failure Mode can be caused by several Causes. Each one of the causes can 
potentially lead to the Failure. Either singly or multiply.  
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FMEA doesn’t follow Cause-Effect relationships.  
FMEA represented in a spreadsheet format can be misleading due to the Failure Modes, Causes 
and Effects written in a Row-Column format. It gives a notion that the Effect written in the first 
row is associated with the Cause written in the first row. Analysis resulting out of this confusion 
can lead one on the wrong path and may not prove to be an effective one.  
For an effective implementation, FMEA has to be organized in a tree format. The spreadsheet-
like format that you see is only a report document representation of the actual FMEA which is 
easy for printing.  
2.1. Health care (PFMEA) 
 
This point consists to design step by step an FMEA of prescribing and dispensing an analgesic, 
following the steps that I explained in the theoretical part of the FMEA’s design and structure. 
 
They have separated the main process to a few sub processes, what is very useful in PFMEA 
because each process has its different parts and steps and you can study them separately,because 
in the part of prescribing the analgesic, an expert who could design the FMEA would be a 
doctor, but in the part of dispensing, would be a pharmacist. It would be the same in factory 
process, because you would have different workers and experts in the different steps of the 
process.  
 
The three subprocesses are the following: 
 Prescribing 
 Dispensing 
 Monitoring 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between failures, causes and effects 
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Once they had got the sub processes, they look for the functions that the sub processes have to 
accomplish. It’s shown in the first column. Secondly, the table shows how they can fail in the 
objective to achieve the functions. Thirdly, the diagram shows the possible causes of that failure 
and in the next column the consequences of it. 
 
After that, we can see the rankings of severity and probability of that failure and the 
multiplication of them, the RPN. 
 
To conclude, in the last column we see the possible actions to prevent and detect each failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  
         Figure 4.  
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Function Failure Modes 
(what might happen) 
Causes 
(why it happens) 
Effects Severity Probability RPN Actions to Reduce 
Failure Mode 
Prescribing 
Assess patient Inaccurate pain 
assessment 
Cultural influences; patient 
unable to articulate 
Poor pain control 2 4 8 Standard scale to help assess 
pain; training on cultural 
influences 
Choose 
analgesic/mode 
of delivery 
Wrong analgesic 
selected 
Clinical situation not 
considered (age, renal 
function, allergies, etc.); 
tolerance to opiates not 
considered; standard PCA 
protocols not followed (or not 
available); concomitant use of 
other analgesics not 
considered; drug shortage; 
knowledge deficit; improper 
selection of patients 
appropriate for PCA 
Improper dosing; 
improper drug; allergic 
response; 
improper use of 
substitute drug 
4 3 12 CPOE with decision support, 
clinical pharmacy program; 
standard PCA protocol with 
education on use; point-of-use 
access to drug information; 
feedback mechanism on drug 
shortages with information on 
substitute drugs available; 
selection criteria for PCA 
patients 
Prescribe 
analgesic 
Wrong dose 
(loading, PCA, 
constant, lock-out), 
route, frequency 
 
Proper patient 
monitoring not 
ordered 
 
Prescribed on wrong 
patient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No order received 
Knowledge deficit; mental 
slip; wrong selection from 
list; information about drug 
not available 
 
Knowledge deficit; mental 
slip 
 
 
Similar patient names; patient 
identifier not clear; name 
does not appear on screen 
when ordering medications 
 
 
Unable to reach covering 
physician 
Overdose; under-dose; 
ADR 
 
 
 
 
Failure to detect 
problems early to 
prevent harm 
 
Wrong patient receives 
inappropriate drug and 
dose; ADR; allergic 
response 
 
 
 
 
Poor pain control 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
CPOE with decision support; 
clinical pharmacy program; 
standard PCA protocols 
 
 
Standard PCA order sets with 
monitoring guidelines 
 
 
Match therapy to patient 
condition; alerts for look-alike 
patient names; visible 
demographic information on 
order form or screen 
 
 
Proper physician coverage and 
communication channels 
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Function Failure Modes Causes Effects Severity Probability RPN Actions to Reduce 
Failure Mode 
Dispensing 
Send order to 
pharmacy 
Order not 
received/processed 
in pharmacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delay in 
receiving/processing 
order 
Unaware of order on unit; 
medication used from floor 
stock, so order not sent; order 
entered onto wrong form or 
screen; verbal orders not 
documented 
 
 
Order not flagged; inefficient 
process for sending orders to 
pharmacy; order not 
seen/misplaced after reaching 
pharmacy 
Drug therapy omitted; 
Overdose; under-dose; 
ADR; allergic response 
if wrong drug used 
 
 
 
 
 
Delay in dispensing 
drug; use of floor stock 
before pharmacy order 
screening; delay of 
drug therapy 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
9 
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Flagging system for new 
orders; policy to send all orders 
to pharmacy; physician review 
of new orders with unit staff; 
shift chart checks; standard 
verbal order receipt/ 
documentation process 
 
As above; standard, efficient 
process for pharmacy order 
receipt; timely review and 
triaging of orders received in 
pharmacy 
Enter order into 
computer 
Order 
misunderstood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order entered 
incorrectly 
 
 
 
Order entered into 
wrong patient 
profile/wrong 
encounter 
 
 
 
Standard directions 
(concentration, 
mixing instructions) 
in computer wrong 
Illegible order; use of 
abbreviations, trailing zeroes, 
naked decimal doses; verbal 
orders; look-alike drug 
names; order copy unclear 
 
 
 
 
Design of software; computer 
mnemonics; look-alike drugs; 
failure/absence of double 
check 
 
Poor presentation of patient 
demographics (fax 
interference, light imprint, 
order copy unclear); look- 
alike names 
 
 
Use of substitute drug due to 
shortage; overlook default 
directions in computer when 
changing processes 
Overdose, under-dose; 
allergic response; 
ADR; delay in therapy; 
poor pain control 
Same as above 
Same as above 
 
 
Overdose, under-dose; 
poor pain control 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
CPOE; preprinted orders; pro- 
hibit dangerous abbreviations, 
dose expressions, non-urgent 
verbal orders; fax original order 
to pharmacy; seek clarification 
directly with prescriber 
 
User-friendly order entry 
process; look-alike drug alerts; 
double check process for order 
entry 
 
CPOE; vivid demographics on 
order forms/screens; high 
quality fax machines, routine 
maintenance; view only access 
to prior patient encounters; 
alerts for look-alike names 
 
Checklist/testing to ensure 
revisions in electronic/print 
when changing processes/ 
drugs; quick access to 
information on substitute drugs 
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Function Failure Modes Causes Effects Severity Probability RPN Actions to Reduce 
Failure Mode 
Dispensing  
Produce label Label inaccurate 
 
 
Label unclear 
 
 
 
 
Label not printed 
 
 
 
 
Label lost 
Inaccurate order entry 
 
 
Ambiguous information; poor 
quality of printer 
 
 
Equipment malfunction; 
improper interface with 
pharmacy computer 
 
Inefficient process for 
printing/retrieving labels; 
remote location of printer 
Overdose, under-dose; 
wrong route; ADR 
 
Same as above; delay 
in therapy; poor pain 
control 
 
Missed therapy; delay 
in therapy; poor pain 
control 
 
Same as above 
3 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
9 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
4 
As above under “order entered 
into computer” section 
 
High quality laser printer; 
improve presentation of label 
information with nursing input 
 
Routine equipment 
maintenance and performance 
testing 
 
Reorganize workflow and 
placement of printers to 
improve efficiency 
Prepare 
medication 
Wrong drug 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wrong diluent 
 
 
Wrong dilution/ 
concentration 
Look-alike products stored 
near each other; drug 
shortage; knowledge deficit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Same as above 
 
 
Knowledge deficit; 
calculation error 
ADR; overdose; under- 
dose; allergic reaction; 
poor pain control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADR; toxicity from 
diluent 
 
Overdose; under-dose; 
poor pain control 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
12 
Separate look-alike products; 
PCA protocols; feedback 
mechanism on drug shortages 
with information on substitute 
drugs available; readily 
available mixing protocols; 
compounding log of ingredients 
with lot numbers; independent 
double check 
 
Same as above 
 
PCA protocols; independent 
double check for all 
calculations 
Check 
medication 
before 
distribution 
Check not 
completed 
 
Check inadequate 
Inadequate staffing patterns 
 
 
Same as above; 
environmental factors 
(distractions, space, lighting, 
noise); inefficient workflow; 
human factors 
Potential error not 
detected 
 
Same as above 
3 
 
 
3 
3 
 
 
3 
9 
 
 
9 
Adequate staffing patterns 
 
 
As above; environmental and 
workflow improvements; 
mental warm-ups before 
checking to increase task focus; 
use of verbal checks 
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Function Failure Modes Causes Effects Severity Probability RPN Actions to Reduce 
Failure Mode 
Dispensing  
Deliver 
medication to 
patient care unit 
Delay in distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delivered to wrong 
unit 
Inadequate staffing 
patterns/equipment used for 
delivery of drugs; inefficient 
drug delivery system; 
delivery equipment 
mechanical failure; shared 
delivery system 
 
Inadequate, untimely 
interface with 
admission/transfer 
information 
Delay in drug therapy; 
use of floor stock 
before pharmacy order 
screening 
 
 
 
 
 
Same as above; 
omitted doses; 
unneeded doses on 
wrong unit (possible 
administration to 
wrong patient) 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
Establish dedicated delivery 
system under direct control of 
pharmacy; use dedicated 
staff/equipment for medication 
delivery; routine maintenance 
and update of equipment 
 
 
Timely and seamless 
communication of 
admissions/transfers to 
pharmacy 
Monitoring 
Monitor effects 
of medication 
Insufficient 
monitoring of 
effects of PCA 
Workload; knowledge deficit; 
monitoring parameters not 
ordered; ineffective 
communication between 
caregivers; cultural influences 
Failure to recognize the 
consequences of an 
error before patient 
harm occurs; inability 
to evaluate pain 
management; poor pain 
control 
3 3 9 Standard order sets with 
monitoring guidelines; standard 
scale to help assess pain; 
training on cultural influences; 
proper staffing patterns and 
safe workload; use flow sheet 
at bedside to document PCA 
and patient monitoring 
parameters 
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Scoring 
Guidelines* 
Key for Severity Rating: 
 
Severity Score Description 
1 Minor patient outcome: No injury, nor increased length of stray, nor increased level of care 
2 Moderate patient outcome: Increased length of stay or increased level of care for 1 to 2 patients 
3 Major patient outcome: Permanent lessening of bodily functioning (sensory, motor, physiologic, or intellectual), disfigurement, 
surgical intervention required, increased length of stay for 3 or more patients, increase level of care for 3 or more patients 
4 Catastrophic patient outcome: death or major permanent loss of function (sensory, motor, physiologic, intellectual), suicide, rape, 
hemolytic transfusion reaction, surgery/procedure on the wrong patient or wrong part of body, infant abduction or discharge to 
wrong family 
 
Key for Probability Rating: 
 
Probability Score Description 
1 Remote: Unlikely to occur (may happen sometime in 5 to 30 years) 
2 Uncommon: Possible to occur (may happen sometime in 2 to 5 years) 
3 Occasional: Probably will occur (may happen several times in 1 to 2 years) 
4 Frequent: Likely to occur immediately or within a short period (may happen several times in one year) 
 
 
Key for RPN: 
 
Hazard score = Severity Score x Probability Score 
 
Hazard Scoring Matrix: 
 
Failure modes with scores that fall in the gray area (8 and greater) should be given highest priority 
 
Probability Severity of Effect 
Catastrophic Major Moderate Minor 
Frequent 16 12 8 4 
Occasional 12 9 6 3 
Uncommon 8 6 4 2 
Remote 4 3 2 1 
*Scoring method adapted from: VA National Center for Patient Safety, Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA™) 
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2.2. Stedifoot design 
This point consists to design step by step an FMEA of a stedifoot design, following the steps 
that I explained in the theoretical part of the FMEA’s design and structure. First of all, I am 
going to explain what a stedifoot is. It is an innovative walking aid attachment for both indoor 
and outdoor use, providing additional contact with the ground, resulting in improved grip, 
stability and support for those with a variety of walking disabilities and designed specifically for 
people with moderate, but permanent walking disabilities, who need the use of, or assistance 
from, a stick, crutch or other device
[2]
. 
 
Secondly, it’s time to study which are the functions that the stedifoot has to accomplish to 
satisfy the company and customer desires. 
They have found six: 
 Enhances stability to existing walking sticks that the ferrule cannot provide 
 Easily attaches to / detaches from most walking sticks with ease 
 Remains in correct position during use 
 Aesthetics 
 Recommendations to new customers 
 Conforms to regulations 
 
And to achieve these functions, some requirements have to be accomplished. They’ve separated 
it in function of the different parts of the stedifoot, which are the following: 
 Body 
1. Remains inside a specified space envelope 
2. Allows handling without injury 
3. Provides sufficient flexibility when under load 
4. Resistant to the operating environment 
 Sole 
5. Provides a durable non-slip foot print indoors and outdoors 
6. Does not transfer colour to surfaces 
 Anti-slip Pad 
7. Provides a durable non-slip surface to retain the ferrule 
8. Retains colour throughout life time 
 Stedigrip 
9. Secures the stedigrip to the walking stick shaft 
10. Clips and unclips with a specified range of shaft dimensions 
11. Allows handling without injury 
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Each function has its own requirements to be accomplished, but for the design is better to get all 
the requirements to achieve the functions and after separate it by the element parts of the 
stedifoot, to make clearer the FMEA diagram and its implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next table shows the complete FMEA of the stedifoot design. In the first column, there are 
the requirements that we have to achieve. In the second one, there are the potential failure 
modes, it means, how the requirements cannot be accomplished.  
 
The third column show the possible consequences of don’t accomplish the requirements. The 
fourth column shows the severity in a ranking 1-10 of each failure.  
The next one describes the potential causes of each failure. The sixth column shows the actions 
that the company can do to prevent the fail. 
In the seventh column we see the frequency of a failure due to this cause can occur in a ranking 
from 1 to 10.  
 
The next column describes the possible actions to detect the fail and the ninth shows the 
possibility to detect the fail in a detection ranking from 1 to 10.  
To conclude, the last one shows the RPN, which is the multiplication of the three previous 
rankings and shows the risk priority of each fail due to its cause. 
 
Figure 5. Real stedifoot 
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Requirement Potential 
Failure 
Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
S Potential 
Cause(s) of 
Failure 
Preventive 
Actions 
O Detection 
actions 
D RPN 
System 
element: Body 
Remains 
inside a  
speci- 
fied  
space  
envelope 
Body  
exceeds 
space  
envelope 
Stedigrip  
becomes a 
tripping hazard 
10 [Body  
dimen- 
sions] 
Foot  
print is  
too wide 
CAD 3 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
2 60 
Loss of  
customer  
confidence/  
referrals 
8 
Infringement of  
regulations 
10 
Allows  
han- 
dling  
without  
injury 
Causes  
injury  
when  
han- 
dled  
(cut fin- 
ger) 
Loss of  
customer  
confidence /  
referrals 
8 [Body  
dimen- 
sions] 
Surface  
finish  
not spec- 
ified on  
drawing 
Draw- 
ing spec- 
ifies no  
sharp  
edges 
1 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
1 10 
Infringement of  
regulations 
10 
Provdes  
suffi- 
cient  
flexibili- 
ty when  
under  
load 
Form  
impedes 
shock  
absorp- 
tion /  
flexibility 
Stedi- 
grip  
does  
not  
increase 
stability  
sufficient- 
ly 
9 [Body  
dimen- 
sions] 
Thickness  
impedes 
shock  
absorption/  
flexibility 
Design  
calcula- 
tions 
2 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
2 36 
CAD Prototype 
testing Stress  
Analysis 
[Metal] 
Metal  
specified is  
too rigid 
Design  
calcula- 
tions 
3 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
2 54 
Steel  
specified 
Prototype 
testing 
Deforma- 
tion  
when  
exposed 
to loads 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8 [Metal] 
Metal  
speci- 
fied is  
too soft 
Design  
calcula- 
tions 
3 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
2 54 
Stedigrip  
does not  
increase 
stability  
sufficiently 
 
 
 
9 Steel  
specified 
Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
  19 
Stedi- 
grip  
decreas- 
es walk- 
ing stick  
stability 
9 
Resistant  
to the  
operat- 
ing envi- 
ronment 
Corro- 
sion of  
the body 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8 [Body  
coating] 
Surface  
protec- 
tion  
peels off 
Anodise 
d steel 
1 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
1 8 
Poor aes- 
thetics 
6 
System 
element: Sole 
Provides  
a  
durable  
non-slip  
foot  
print  
indoors  
and out- 
doors 
Tread of  
the sole  
does  
not pro- 
vide a  
firm grip  
on the  
ground 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8 [Rubber] 
Incor- 
rect rub- 
ber type 
Industri- 
al con- 
veyor  
belt rub- 
ber spec- 
ified 
2 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
3 60 
Stedi- 
grip  
does  
not  
increase 
stability  
sufficient- 
ly 
9 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
Infringe- 
ment of  
regula- 
tions 
10 [Adhe- 
sive] 
Insuffi- 
cent  
adhe- 
sion  
proper- 
ties  
through- 
out  
expect- 
ed life  
time 
Water  
proof sili- 
con  
adhe- 
sive  
specified 
4 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
3 120 
Stedi- 
grip  
decreas- 
es walk- 
ing stick  
stability 
9 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
[Rubber] 
Rubber  
is not  
resistant  
to specified 
temperature  
range 
 
none 10 none 10 1000 
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[Rubber  
dimen- 
sions] 
Sole is  
thinner  
than the  
body 
Draw- 
ing spec- 
ifies over- 
size by  
2mm to  
prevent  
body  
from  
contact- 
ing  
objects 
1 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
1 10 
CAD 
Exces- 
sive  
tread  
wear 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8 [Rubber] 
Incor- 
rect rub- 
ber type 
Industri- 
al con- 
veyor  
belt rub- 
ber spec- 
ified 
2 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
3 54 
Stedi- 
grip  
does  
not  
increase 
stability  
sufficient- 
ly 
9 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
Stedi- 
grip  
decreas- 
es walk- 
ing stick  
stability 
9 [Rubber  
dimen- 
sions] 
Insuffi- 
cient  
thickness 
Industri- 
al con- 
veyor  
belt rub- 
ber spec- 
ified 
2 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
2 36 
Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
Tread  
peels  
away  
from the  
body 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8 [Adhe- 
sive] 
Insuffi- 
cent  
adhe- 
sion  
proper- 
ties  
through- 
out  
expect- 
ed life  
time 
Water  
proof sili- 
con  
adhe- 
sive  
specified 
4 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
3 120 
Stedi- 
grip  
become 
s a trip- 
ping haz- 
ard 
10 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
Poor aes- 
thetics 
6 
Stedigrip  
decreases 
walk- 
ing stick  
stability 
9 
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Does  
not trans- 
fer  
colour  
to sur- 
faces 
Black  
marks  
left on  
floor sur- 
faces (e. 
g. lino) 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8 [Rubber] 
Incor- 
rect rub- 
ber type 
Industri- 
al con- 
veyor  
belt rub- 
ber spec- 
ified 
2 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
3 48 
Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
System 
element: Anti-
slip Pad 
Provides  
a  
durable  
non-slip  
surface  
to retain  
the fer- 
rule 
Does  
not  
retain  
the fer- 
rule in  
correct  
place 
Stedi- 
grip  
decreas- 
es walk- 
ing stick  
stability 
9 [Pad  
Dimen- 
sions] 
insuffi- 
cient  
size of  
pad  
specified 
Over  
sized for  
aesthet- 
ics 
1 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
1 10 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
Infringe- 
ment of  
regula- 
tions 
10 [Rubber] 
Incor- 
rect rub- 
ber type 
ahde- 
sive rub- 
ber pad  
used is  
similar  
to lino  
flooring 
5 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
6 300 
Retains  
colour  
through- 
out life  
time 
Colour  
loss /  
degra- 
dation  
of the  
anti-slip  
pad 
Poor aes- 
thetics 
6 [Rubber] 
Rubber  
is not UV  
resistant 
none 10 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
7 630 
Stedi- 
grip  
does  
not  
increase 
stability  
sufficiently 
9 
System 
element: 
Stedigrip 
Secures  
the stedi- 
grip to  
the walk- 
ing stick  
shaft 
Insuffi- 
cient  
compres- 
sion 
Walking  
stick  
rotates  
during  
use 
9 [Dimen- 
sions] 
incor- 
rect  
form /  
type  
specified 
CAD 8 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
3 240 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confidence /  
referrals 
8 
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Stedi- 
grip  
does  
not  
increase 
stability  
sufficient- 
ly 
9   
grip  
materi- 
als] 
Plastic  
speci- 
fied is  
too soft 
CAD 8 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
3 240 
Infringe- 
ment of  
regula- 
tions 
10 Design  
calcula- 
tions 
Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
Stedifit  
works  
loose  
from the  
body 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8 [Fastnen- 
ers] 
Incor- 
rect nut  
& bolt  
type  
speci- 
fied  
(wrong  
thread /  
tighten- 
ing  
torque) 
Design  
calcula- 
tions 
4 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
4 160 
Stedi- 
grip  
does  
not  
increase 
stability  
sufficient- 
ly 
9 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
Stedi- 
grip  
decreas- 
es walk- 
ing stick  
stability 
9 [Fastnen- 
ers] 
Incor- 
rect nut  
& bolt  
type  
speci- 
fied  
(strength) 
Design  
calcula- 
tions 
4 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
2 80 
Infringe- 
ment of  
regula- 
tions 
10 M6  
allen  
key bolt  
used 
Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
Clips  
and  
unclips  
with a  
speci- 
fied  
range  
of shaft  
dimen- 
sions 
Stedifit is  
difficult  
to  
remove  
from  
walking  
stick 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8   
grip  
materi- 
als] 
Plastic  
speci- 
fied is  
too rigid 
CAD 3 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
3 72 
Cannot  
be used  
with  
large  
diame- 
ter walk- 
ing sticks 
 
 
7 Design  
calcula- 
tions 
Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
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Cannot  
be  
attache 
d  
detache 
d by  
uses  
with  
arthiritic  
fingers /  
poor  
grip  
strength 
7 [Dimen- 
sions] 
incor- 
rect  
form /  
type  
specified 
CAD 8 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
3 192 
Stedifit  
snaps  
off  
duing  
removal 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8   
grip  
materi- 
als] 
Plastic  
speci- 
fied is  
too rigid 
CAD 3 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
3 72 
Cannot  
be used  
with  
large  
diame- 
ter walk- 
ing sticks 
7 Design  
calcula- 
tions 
Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
[Body  
dimen- 
sions] 
Thick- 
ness  
impedes 
shock  
absorp- 
tion /  
flexibility 
Design  
calcula- 
tions 
2 Destruc- 
tive test- 
ing 
2 32 
CAD Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
Stress  
Analysis 
Allows  
han- 
dling  
without  
injury 
Causes  
injury  
when  
han- 
dled  
(cut fin- 
ger) 
Loss of  
cus- 
tomer  
confi- 
dence /  
referrals 
8 [Dimen- 
sions] 
Surface  
finish  
not spec- 
ified on  
draw- 
ing  
(flashing) 
Draw- 
ing spec- 
ifies no  
sharp  
edges 
1 Proto- 
type test- 
ing 
1 10 
Infringe- 
ment of  
regula- 
tions 
10 
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3.1. Recycling WEEE industrial plant PFMEA 
 
In this section, I am going to design a Process FMEA of a Recycling Waste of Electric and 
Electronic Equipment (WEEE) industrial plant. First of all, I explain what does the plant and 
how it works. Firstly, the plant receives the WEEE and they store it. Then, the waste goes to a 
disposal unit, which shred the trash. Secondly , the workers separate the rubbish in 4 main 
groups: iron material, no iron material, plastic and glass. The breaking up could be done by a 
machine or manually.  
 
Thirdly, they shred the waste again but in a smaller size than the first trituration, in a size of 30 
mm. Finally, they compact the material per each group and they sell it to another plant which 
will melt the material to recycle it in a last step. 
 
After the explanation of how works the plant, I’m going to enumerate the steps of the recycling 
process to make easy the search of the functions and the requirements of each step. They are the 
following:  
 Transportation the waste to the plant 
 Store the waste 
 First trituration 
 Breaking up per each material group 
 Second trituration 
 Compacting 
 
Once I have the process steps, my goal is do the PFMEA table with the functions and 
requirements per each process, the failure modes, the causes of that fail, the four rankings of 
detection, occurrence, severity and RPN, and finally the possible actions to prevent and detect it. 
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Function/ 
Requirement 
Failure  
Mode 
Effects of Failure Causes  S O D RPN Preventive actions Repairing/Detection 
actions 
Process Step: Transportation the waste to the plant 
The waste must 
be WEEE 
The waste is not 
WEEE 
We discover it before 
compacting. 
We lost time and 
energy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The company which 
recollect the rubbish 
has mixed it with 
another type of rubbish 
4 5 2 40 Have a work team with the 
mission of find and 
separate, once we have 
done the first trituration, 
the rubbish which is not 
WEEE. We have an 
agreement with the 
supplier company to bring 
it back. 
Have a work team with the 
mission of find and 
separate, once we have 
done the first trituration, the 
rubbish which is not 
WEEE. 
We don’t detect it 
and we send it to the 
next plant.  
We lost prestige and 
reputation because 
we don’t provide the 
correct materials. 
 
Transport of the 
waste within the 
estimated time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The lorry which 
brings the waste has 
an accident. 
Delay of the 
production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lorry too heavy to 
drive it with security. 
Driver was not in well 
conditions to drive. 
Fortuitous accident. 
5 2 1 10 Contract a well-known 
company of transportation. 
Make statistics about the 
accidents that our 
transporters have in the last 
few years. 
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Function/ 
Requirement 
Failure  
Mode 
Effects of Failure Causes  S O D RPN Preventive actions Repairing/Detection 
actions 
Process Step: Store the waste 
The waste stored 
must be less than 
30 Tn. 
Waste stored is 
more than 30 Tn. 
We don’t have space 
to keep the waste 
which has brought 
the lorry. It goes to 
another recycling 
plant. We lose 
prestige. 
Our logistic director 
didn’t make his job and 
he hasn’t anticipated 
the situation. 
3 3 2 18 Have a good logistic 
schedule and department. 
Pay the transport of the 
material by lorry to don’t 
lose our reputation. 
Process Step: First trituration 
The garbage 
disposal unit does 
its job well. 
Breakdown in the 
trituration machine 
 
Delay of the 
production. Spend 
money to repair it. 
We haven’t done the 
necessary technical 
inspections. 
5 4 5 100 Do the required technical 
inspections to the machine. 
Divert the rubbish to the 
other disposal unit. Have an 
expert worker who can 
repair it in the shortest 
time. 
Failure in the 
electric supply 
 
Delay of the 
production. Plant 
could be stopped. 
Failure in the electric 
public network or in 
our electric network. 
7 2 7 98 Do the correct 
maintenance of the electric 
network. Have an electric 
generator. 
Use the electric generator 
until we recover the electric 
supply. Be in contact with 
the local council to know 
which the problem is. 
The blades have 
been worn. 
 
 
The big or strong 
waste has not cut. 
 
We haven’t done the 
necessary technical 
inspections. 
3 6 2 36 Do the required 
inspections and the correct 
maintenance of them. 
Have a few spare blades. 
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Function/ 
Requirement 
Failure  
Mode 
Effects of Failure Causes  S O D RPN Preventive actions Repairing/Detection 
actions 
Process Step: Breaking up per each material group 
We separate the 
waste in the 4 
material groups: 
iron material, no 
iron material, 
plastic and glass. 
We mixed some of 
the 4 main groups 
between them. 
 
We lost prestige and 
reputation because 
we don’t provide the 
correct materials. 
The separation 
machines don’t work 
correctly. The workers 
haven’t done their job 
correctly. 
4 5 2 40 Have qualified workers 
who can detect it. Not only 
one worker checks the 
result of the breaking up. 
We check it carefully and if 
the separation is not 
correct, we put it back and 
separate again. 
We don’t detect 
other types of 
waste. 
 
We lost prestige and 
reputation because 
we don’t provide the 
correct materials. 
The separation 
machines don’t work 
correctly. The workers 
haven’t done their job 
correctly. 
Have qualified workers 
who can detect it. Not only 
one worker checks the 
result of the breaking up 
We check it carefully and if 
the separation is not 
correct, we put it back and 
separate again. 
The breaking up 
machine does its 
job well. 
Breakdown in the 
separation 
machines. 
The workers have to 
separate the materials 
by themselves. If they 
cannot do it, we have 
a production delay. 
We haven’t done the 
necessary technical 
inspections. 
 
6 4 5 120 Do the required technical 
inspections to the machine. 
Have an expert worker who 
can repair it in the shortest 
time, because is not very 
profitable to have two 
breaking up machines of 
the same material. 
Failure in the 
electric supply 
 
The workers have to 
separate the materials 
by themselves. If they 
cannot do it, we have 
a production delay 
Failure in the electric 
public network or in 
our electric network. 
7 2 7 98 Do the correct 
maintenance of the electric 
network. Have an electric 
generator. 
Use the electric generator 
until we recover the electric 
supply. Be in contact with 
the local council to know 
which the problem is. 
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Function/ 
Requirement 
Failure  
Mode 
Effects of Failure Causes  S O D RPN Preventive actions Repairing/Detection 
actions 
Process Step: Second trituration 
The blades have 
to cut the 
material at 30 
mm. 
The machine is not 
well settled and 
don’t provide the 
material with the 
correct size. 
 
We have a material 
for compacting 
without the correct 
size that he following 
plant requires to us. 
The blades come loose 
and they have to be 
fixed. 
4 4 4 64 Do the required technical 
inspections to the machine. 
Get samples of the material 
packs and measure them. 
Have an expert worker who 
can repair it in the shortest 
time. 
The garbage 
disposal unit does 
its job well. 
Breakdown in the 
trituration machine 
 
Delay of the 
production. Spend 
money to repair it. 
We haven’t done the 
necessary technical 
inspections. 
5 4 5 100 Do the required technical 
inspections to the machine. 
Divert the rubbish to the 
other disposal unit. Have an 
expert worker who can 
repair it in the shortest 
time. 
Failure in the 
electric supply 
 
Delay of the 
production. Plant 
could be stopped. 
Failure in the electric 
public network or in 
our electric network. 
7 2 7 98 Do the correct 
maintenance of the electric 
network. Have an electric 
generator. 
Use the electric generator 
until we recover the electric 
supply. 
 
 
 
The blades have 
been worn. 
 
 
The big or strong 
waste has not cut. 
 
We haven’t done the 
necessary technical 
inspections. 
3 6 2 36 Do the required 
inspections and the correct 
maintenance of them. 
Have a few spare blades. 
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Function/ 
Requirement 
Failure  
Mode 
Effects of Failure Causes  S O D RPN Preventive actions Repairing/Detection 
actions 
Process Step: Compacting 
Compacted waste 
with the correct 
material and size 
and ready to be 
delivered. 
More demand of 
material than offer 
of it we can 
produce. 
 
The client could start 
to search another 
recycling plant. 
Important construction 
project which needs a 
lot of material. 
4 4 4 64 Updated market study to 
know the needs of the 
companies around us. 
Get an agreement to deliver 
the material in a few 
instalments. 
Robbery of 
material already 
compacted. 
 
Loss a lot of money 
and loss of reputation 
because we cannot 
deliver the orders. 
No security in the plant 
or not enough. 
7 2 5 70 Have the enough number 
of security guards and 
cameras. 
Be in touch with the local 
police if something 
happens. 
Composition 
material in the 
waste packs is not 
correctly. 
We lost prestige and 
reputation because 
we don’t provide the 
correct materials. 
We haven’t done 
correctly the breaking 
up step. 
4 5 2 40 Have qualified workers 
who can detect it. Not only 
one worker checks the 
result of the breaking up. 
The next time we give for 
free a pack to the following 
plant to maintain our 
prestige and reputation. 
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3.2. Table lamp DFMEA 
 
In this part, my objective is to design a DFMEA of the table lamp that we have in the Ingegneria 
Gestionale office in the University of Udine. This model is from the company PAN and it’s the 
model TOM PFA980. 
 
Firstly, I am going to enumerate the main functions that the lamp has to accomplish: 
 Stability 
 Flexibility 
 Capacity to use bulbs until 20 V 
 Allow a voltage of 230 V and a current of 50 Hz 
 Weight less than 1.25 kgs 
 Switch works correctly 
 
Secondly, as I did in the Stedifoot DFMEA in section 2.2, I am going to separate the 
requirements to achieve these functions per each part of the lamp’s body [3]. They are the next:  
 
 Base 
 Base completely flat 
 Volume of 1600cm3 +/-  200cm3 
 Switch works correctly 
 Weight of  850g +/- 100g 
 Stick 
 Length of 20cm +/- 2cm 
 Flexibility of 120º 
 Wire works correctly 
 Head 
 Flexibility of 220º from the stick 
 Capacity to use bulbs until 20 V 
 Allow a voltage of 230 V and a current of 50 Hz 
 
Finally, the table of the next sheet shows the DFMEA diagram with the same pattern than the 
WEE plant PFMEA. 
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Function/ 
Requirement 
Failure  
Mode 
Effects of Failure Causes  S O D RPN Preventive actions Repairing/Detection 
actions 
Part of the lamp: Base 
Base completely 
flat 
Base is not flat There is no stability Error in the commands 
of the production 
machine 
9 2 3 56 Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Volume of 
1600cm3 +/-  200 
 
Volume bigger than 
required 
The lamp take up too 
much space and is 
too heavy 
Error in the commands 
of the production 
machine 
4 2 3 24 Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Volume less than 
required 
The base could not 
have enough space 
for the electronic 
systems or enough 
resistance. 
Error in the commands 
of the production 
machine 
3 2 3 18 Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Switch works 
correctly 
 
Switch doesn’t 
work correctly 
 
The lamp doesn’t 
work; we have to find 
a spare. If we don’t 
detect it, we get bad 
reputation. 
Error in the commands 
of the production 
machine 
3 3 5 45 Switch on and off every 
lamp that we have made. 
It’s quickly and easy and 
we don’t lose too much 
time. 
Have a good and fluid 
system of repairing to be 
quick and don’t lose clients. 
Weight of  850g 
+/- 100 
 
Base heavier than 
required 
The lamp is too 
heavy and the 
consumers would 
choose another 
model. 
Error in the commands 
of the production 
machine 
4 2 3 24 Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
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Base less heavy 
than required 
The base could not 
have enough space 
for the electronic 
systems or enough 
resistance. 
Error in the commands 
of the production 
machine 
3 2 3 18 Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Part of the lamp: Stick 
Length of 20cm 
+/- 2cm 
 
Stick is larger or 
shorter than the 
required length. 
Lose of time 
changing the stick. 
Error in the commands 
of the production 
machine 
1 2 3 6 Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Flexibility of 120º 
 
More flexibility 
than 120 
The union between 
the stick and the base 
could be broken. 
The pieces that subject 
the stick and permit it 
turn around are bad 
designed or built. 
3 3 3 27 Check the union between 
the stick and the base once 
we have assembled them. 
Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Less flexibility than 
120 
The lamp doesn’t 
offer the ideal 
possibilities of 
illumination. 
The pieces that subject 
the stick and permit it 
turn around are bad 
designed or built. 
3 3 3 27 Check the union between 
the stick and the base once 
we have assembled them. 
Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Wire works 
correctly 
 
Wire from the base 
to the head through 
the stick doesn’t 
work 
The lamp doesn’t 
work 
The wire works 
correctly but not the 
electronic system. The 
cable is not well 
connected or it has a 
short-circuit. 
8 2 5 80 It’s difficult to check the 
operation of the cable 
before we check the whole 
lamp. We should check it 
once we have all the 
components. 
Check the lamp and if the 
lamp doesn’t work, we 
should have a workshop 
where we can repair it 
before we will send it to the 
shop. 
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Part of the lamp: Head 
Flexibility of 
220º from the 
stick 
More flexibility 
than 220º 
The union between 
the head and the stick 
could be broken. 
The pieces that join the 
stick and the head 
which permit it turn 
around are bad 
designed or built. 
4 3 3 36 Check the union between 
the stick and the head once 
we have assembled them. 
Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Less flexibility than 
220º 
The lamp doesn’t 
offer the ideal 
possibilities of 
illumination. 
The pieces that join the 
stick and the head 
which permit it turn 
around are bad 
designed or built. 
2 3 3 18 Check the union between 
the stick and the head once 
we have assembled them. 
Analyse samples of the 
production to detect the 
mistakes. 
Capacity to use 
bulbs until 20 V 
 
The lamp has not 
capacity to use 
bulbs until 20V 
The lamp doesn’t 
offer the ideal 
possibilities of 
illumination. 
The electronic circuit 
of the head has a 
problem. The bulb that 
we use to try is blown. 
5 3 5 75 We should sell the lamps 
with a bulb of 20V inside, 
so it will be easy to check 
it. 
Analyse each lamp that we 
produce. If doesn’t work, 
send it to the workshop. 
Allow a voltage 
of 230 V and a 
current of 50 Hz 
 
The lamp doesn’t 
allow the 
international type 
of electricity. 
The lamp doesn’t 
work. 
The electronic circuit 
of the head or the base 
has a problem. 
9 2 5 90 Check the functioning of 
each lamp that we 
produce. 
If the lamp doesn’t work, 
send to our workshop and 
hope that the problem is not 
in the electronic circuit. 
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ANNEX 
[1]: Through the production run of the model, it became a focus of a major scandal 
when it was discovered that the car's design allowed its fuel tank to be easily damaged 
in the event of a rear end collision which often resulted in deadly fires and explosions.  
Furthermore, it was alleged that Ford was aware of this design flaw, but they refused to 
pay the minimal expense of a redesign. 
Instead, it was argued, Ford decided it would be cheaper to pay off possible lawsuits for 
resulting deaths. This discovery of Ford's apparent disregard for human lives in favour 
of profits led to major lawsuits, inconclusive criminal charges, and a costly recall of all 
affected Pintos. 
[2]:  
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